Every connection, mutually verified

BetterSign™

Put a BetterSign identity on every service and require both sides to prove who they are on every connection — with certificates that rotate on their own and trust rooted in a provenance log instead of a static certificate authority.

Stable identity

A VLAD remains stable while its keys and protected metadata rotate.

Self-verifying history

Every state transition is hash-linked and authorized by the previous log state.

Decentralized discovery

VLADemlia helps peers locate current records without becoming the trust root.

Routine rotation

Key changes become signed updates that followers can verify and apply.

Every connection, mutually verified

Zero-Trust mTLS

Why Mutual TLS

Ordinary TLS proves the server to the client and stops there; the server rarely knows who is really calling it. In a zero-trust network that is not enough — every service should prove its identity to every other service, on every connection.

Mutual TLS does exactly that, but it has always been painful in practice: issuing a certificate to every workload, and rotating them all before they expire, is the part teams dread and therefore avoid.

See zero-trust mTLS in action — both sides prove who they are, a rogue is rejected, and certificates rotate themselves with no downtime.

A BetterSign Identity for Every Service

BetterSign gives each service a VLAD and issues it a short-lived X.509 identity — an SVID — rooted in a provenance log rather than a static certificate authority. Both ends of a connection present their SVID and verify the other, so a call is accepted only when both identities check out.

Because the trust root is a plog, rotating a service key or even the issuing authority is a signed entry that every verifier converges on — no CA re-key drama, and no fleet-wide certificate push.

Mutually Authenticated Connection

Service A opens a connection to Service B
Both present their short-lived SVID
Each verifies the other against the plog-rooted trust bundle
The connection is accepted only if both identities check out
SVIDs rotate on their own before they expire

Drop It In Front of Anything

The bettersign proxy adds mutual TLS to services that were never built for it. It terminates SVID-authenticated TLS at the edge, re-establishes mTLS to the backend, and forwards the verified client identity downstream as an X-Forwarded-Client-Cert header, so your application can make authorization decisions from a caller identity it can actually trust.

The result is a zero-trust mesh you can adopt incrementally, without rewriting services to speak mTLS themselves.

Traditional mTLS vs. BetterSign

Traditional mTLS
  • Certificates issued by a static CA
  • Rotation is a scheduled scramble before expiry
  • Revocation via CRLs or OCSP that may lag
  • Re-keying the CA is a major, risky event
BetterSign mTLS
  • SVIDs rooted in a provenance log
  • Certificates rotate on their own, no downtime
  • Revocation is a signed entry the mesh converges on
  • Rotate keys or the authority as routine plog updates
Both sides Mutually authenticated
Certificates Short-lived, self-rotating SVIDs
Trust root Provenance log, not a static CA